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Inherent in the dual role of physician-researcher is a conflict of interest arising out of the
competingobjectivesofresearch andmedicalpractice. Mostcommentary andpolicyrecommen-
dations on this conflict of interest have focused on the problems that arise in negotiations for
informed consent. These are not, however, the only problems presented by this conflict; they
are not necessarily even the most important. In order to deal with these problems, several
commentators have suggested various procedural safeguards to protect the interests of the
patient-subject-for example, separating the roles ofphysician and researcher, or introducing
third parties into the relationship in order to assist in the initial or continuing negotiations for
informed consent.
In my view, the necessity for special procedural protections of patient-subject interests
should be a discretionary judgment of the Institutional Review Board (IRB). In determining
the need forspecial procedural protections for any research protocol, the IRB should consider
three factors. To the extent that any one of these or a combination of two or more seems to
present a problem, the IRB should consider it increasingly important to recommend special
procedural protections:
1. There are serious impairments ofthe prospective subjects' capacities to consent.
2. The risk of physical or psychological injury presented by procedures done in the
interests ofresearch exceeds the threshold of"a minor increment above minimal risk."
3. The protocol is designed to introduce, test, evaluate, or compare therapeutic, diagnos-
tic, orprophylactic maneuvers.
Conflictsbetween the rolesofphysician and researcher are inevitable and, in some
circumstances, incorrigible. Such conflicts are especially problematic when one
individual attempts to playboth roles simultaneously, as is commonly the case in the
conductofclinical trials ofnewtherapies. This paperis an examination ofthe nature
of these-conflicts and a consideration of some steps that may be taken to mitigate
their consequences.
PROFESSIONAL ROLES
Let usbeginwith adeliberatelysimplistic examination ofthe rolesofphysician and
researcher: they are, respectively, to practice medicine and to conduct research. The
definitions below ofthese two enterprises are compatible with those adopted by the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (the National Commission) and are embodied in federal
regulations for the protection ofhuman subjects:
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The term "research" refers to a class of activities designed to develop or
contribute to generalizable knowledge. By generalizable knowledge is meant
theories, principles or relationships (or the accumulation of data on which
they may be based), that can be corroborated by accepted scientific observa-
tion and inference.
The "practice" of medicine or behavioral therapy refers to a class of
activities designed solely to enhance thewell-being ofan individual patient or
client. The purpose of medical therapy or behavioral practice is to provide
diagnosis, preventive treatment or therapy [2:p. 3].
According to these definitions, then,when aphysician ispracticingmedicine, he or
she is performing activities that are designed solely to enhance the well-being of an
individual patient. Superficially, at any rate, it appears that he or she has no
competing or conflicting interests. This appearance is not necessarily correct. The
physician who is not doing research may have various sorts of conflicting interests.
For example, in considering whether to recommend surgery or various diagnostic
tests, the judgment of some physicians may be influenced by the fact that positive
recommendationsyieldgreaterfinancial rewardsforthephysician. Thus, particularly
when other considerations do not clearly indicate the making of a positive or a
negative recommendation, thefinancial interests ofthe physician may, in some cases,
"tip the balance" toward the positive recommendation.
Howdowe safeguard the interestsofthe patient against suchcompeting interests?
In my view, the most powerful safeguard is and ought to be a reliance on the
professional responsibility of the physician. By this phrase I mean a reliance on the
integrity ofeach individual physician, aswell as a reliance on the social pressure that
can be brought to bear by his or her colleagues. There is, of course, a second line of
defense. This protection is reflected in various laws and institutional policies
requiring such things as second opinions for certain sorts of elective surgery and
continual peer review ofongoing activities.
Ratherthan attempt to develop anexhaustive orextensive listofpotential conflicts
of interest in the practice ofmedicine, let usjust stipulate that there are some. The
difference in research is that, by definition, there is invariably something being done
that is designed to benefit a persons or persons other than the subject. Thus, when a
professional assumes the dual role of physician-researcher in relation to a patient-
subject, an inherent conflict exists. Although thisconflictmaynotnecessarilydiffer in
kind from those present in the practice of medicine [2:pp. 7-8], it differs in that, in
medical practice, the usual presumption should be that there is no important conflict
ofinterest. In research, on the other hand, there is no such presumption; invariably,
there is the knowledge that a conflict exists.
RESEARCH AS A BURDEN OR A BENEFIT
Before proceeding further with considerations of the nature and consequences of
the conflicts between the roles ofphysician and researcher, it isworthwhile to reflect
briefly on the assumptions embodied in the ethical codes and regulations designed to
safeguard the rights and welfare of human research subjects. These codes and
regulations reflect the fact that they were written between 1947 and 1981, when the
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prevailing perception ofresearch was that it exposed the subjects to a highlyperilous
business, one from which they required protection [3,4]. This perception was
informed by the events that provided the impetus for the development ofthe ethical
codes-the heinous crimes committed by the Nazi physician-researchers, for which
theywere tried and most ofthem convicted at the Nuremberg war crime trials-and
U.S. federal regulations-exposes ofthe sort provided by Henry Beecher [5] and of
cases such as the Tuskegee, Willowbrook, Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, and
Obedience to Authority studies [2:pp. 69-72,217-220]. The federal regulations
further reflect the fact that theywere based on the recommendations ofthe National
Commission, a body that was itself highly influenced by the ethos of the late 1960s
and 1970s, exemplified by the civil rights movement, and characterized bychallenges
to the legitimacy of the authority of governments, corporations, and powerful
professions [6]. Medical ethics was preoccupied with "redressing the imbalance of
power" between the paternalistic physician and exploitative researcher and their
patients and subjects, respectively.
Research was widely perceived as an exceedingly hazardous occupation from
which prospective subjects-particularly vulnerable ones-required protection. It is
no accident that federal regulations governing research are entitled: "Policy for
Protection ofHuman Research Subjects."
Subsequently, it hasbecome clear that manypersonswho are prospective subjects,
even highly vulnerable individuals, regard participation as a subject in research as a
benefit rather than a burden [3]. Although evidence that this attitude might be the
case was published much earlier [7,8], the voices of the patients and prospective
subjects were first heard clearly in 1986, during the planning and conduct of the
randomized clinical trial (RCT) comparing azidothymidine (AZT) with placebo in
the treatment of patients with AIDS. Pointing to the results of very limited pilot
studies suggesting the efficacyofAZTindelayingmorbidity andmortality, thosewith
AIDS and their doctors identified AZT as "the best available therapy" for AIDS.
Now access to an investigational drug was clearly perceived as a benefit and not as a
burden, and enrollment in the RCTwas regarded as the onlyway to secure even a 50
percent chance to receive "the best available therapy" [3].
The belief that enrollment in a RCT is the only way to gain an opportunity to
receive "the best available therapy" has been associated with a number of alarming
behaviors that are detrimental to thevalidity ofsome trials. For example, during the
placebo-controlled trial ofAZTforthetreatment ofAIDS in 1986, certainpatients-
with the aid of their physicians-falsified medical histories so that these patients
would appear to match the inclusion criteria for the RCT [9]. In the same trial, some
patient-subjects shared their pillswith others so that all could have an opportunity to
receive at least some of"the best available therapy" [9].
Falsification ofeligibility criteria with the aid ofpersonal physicians has also been
reported in other fields, such as oncology [10]. Furthermore, because RCTs of
oncology therapies are, typically, not conducted according to a double-blind design,
patients and theirphysicians knowwho is to receive which therapy. Some commenta-
tors have argued that physicians should refer their patients to such a trial in order to
secure access to "the best available therapy" without disclosing to the investigator
their plan to withdraw if those patients are assigned to the therapy with which the
"best available" is being compared [11]. Such plans may be criticized on several
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grounds, including the fact that this type of misrepresentation shows disrespect for
the investigator and undermines thevalidity ofthe trial.
In passing, it is worth noting that many patients regard participation in RCTs as
beneficial for reasons apart from gaining access to otherwise unavailable investiga-
tional therapies. Survey researchers have found that the majority of respondents
view such participation as a way to gain access to superior medical care [12,13]. For
somevery poor persons, it maybe the onlyway to get any medical care [4].
SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF THE CONFLICT
Most published commentary on the conflict between the roles of physician and
researchercenters on the issue ofinformed consent. Who should negotiate informed
consentwiththe patient-subject? Should itbe the personal physician, the researcher,
or the physician-researcher? Should there be, in some cases, another agent involved,
such as a consent auditor or an advocate? Although federal regulations are silent on
this matter, the leading ethical codes are not. According to the Nuremberg Code
[2:pp. 425-426]:
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality ofthe consent rests
upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is
apersonal dutyand responsibilitywhich maynotbe delegated to anotherwith
impunity.
The Nuremberg Code, of course, is not concerned with such complicated roles as
physician-researcherorpatient-subject. Itisdesigned toprovideguidance toresearch-
erswho are using nothingbut non-therapeutic procedures. Although theymight also
be physicians, when they are acting according to the guidance provided by Nurem-
berg, they are performing exclusively in the role ofresearcher.
Many commentators on the practice of medicine have expressed concern about
the imbalance of power between the physician and the patient. Many of these
commentators have drawn upon Talcott Parsons's perspective on the social role of
"sick person," the privileges and responsibilities of the role, and the dependency of
the sick person upon the physician to "legitimate" that role [14]. Thus, when a "sick
person" is invited to perform also in the role ofsubject, there is great concern about
the potentialities for exploitation ofthis imbalance ofpower.
Considerable debate has also occurred as towhether aphysicianwho is involved in
a physician-patient relationship can negotiate fairly with the patient for informed
consent to become a subject [2:pp. 121-123]. Spiro, for example, asserts that a
physician having a close relationship with a patient can usually persuade that patient
to do almost anything [15]. Unlike most commentators, because Spiro emphasizes
the importance ofthe closeness ofthe relationship, he feels the problem is greater in
private practice than it is forward or clinic patients.
Henry Beecher reviewed the literature on this subject; in his conclusion, he
suggests that consent might not be either the only or the most important issue [16]:
An evengreater safeguard forthepatient than consent isthe presence ofan
informed, able, conscientious, compassionate, responsible investigator, for it
is recognized that patients can, when imperfectly informed, be induced to
agree, unwisely, to manythings....
A considerable safeguard is to be found in the practice of having at least
two physicians involved.... First there is the physician concerned with the
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care of the patient, his first interest is the patient's welfare; and second, the
physician-scientist whose interest is the sound conduct of the investigation.
Perhaps too often a single individual attempts to encompass both roles.
Beecher was not clear about which of these two physicians he would have
negotiate informed consent. The Declaration of Helsinki requires the following
[2:pp. 427-429]:
When obtaining informed consent for the research project, the doctor
should be particularly cautious ifthe subject is in a dependent relationship to
him or her or may consent under duress. In that case the informed consent
should be obtained by a doctor who is not engaged in the investigation and
who is completely independent ofthis official relationship (Principle I.10).
In its report on Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), the National Commission
suggests, in its commentary on Recommendation 3D, that the IRB should be aware
ofthe advantages and disadvantages (for the patient-subjects) ofhaving one individ-
ual perform the dual role ofthe physician-researcher [17]. At its discretion, the IRB
may require a "neutral person" not otherwise associated with the research or the
investigator to be present when consent is sought or to observe the conduct of the
research. This "neutral person" maybe assigned to play a role in informing subjects
of their rights and of the details of protocols, assuring that there is continuing
willingness to participate, determining the advisability of continued participation,
receiving complaints from subjects, and bringing grievances to the attention of the
IRB. Federal regulations developed in response to the recommendations of the
National Commission do not, however, reflect these considerations.
With one exception, the National Commission made no recommendations for the
development of federal regulations on the dual role of physician-investigator. That
exception is Recommendation 1H, in its Report on those institutionalized as
mentallyinfirm, which states that the IRB must determine that [18]:
Adequate provisions are made to assure that no prospective subjectwill be
approached to participate in the research unless a person who is responsible
for the health care of the subject has determined that the invitation to
participate in the research and such participation itselfwill not interfere with
the health care ofthe subject....
In its commentary on this recommendation, the National Commission further
elaborates that, when the potential subject's physician or other therapist is involved
in the proposed research, independent clinicaljudgment should be obtained regard-
ing the appropriateness of including that patient in the research. This provision is
intended to reduce conflicts of interest between the objectives of health care and
those ofresearch, while still permittingclinicians, who maybe especially knowledge-
able regarding promising avenues of research, to apply their expertise in both
enterprises. Although this recommendation is addressed to the same problem as
Principle I.10 of the Declaration of Helsinki, it does not require that a third party
obtain informed consent.
The National Commission recommendedthat invarious situations there shouldbe
third parties, in addition to the researcher and the subject, involved in the consent
negotiations; in some circumstances, they should also be involved in the continuing
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negotiations during the course of the research, in order to see whether the subject
wishes to withdraw from the protocol, among other reasons. In the National
Commission's several reports, thethirdparties arevariouslycalled"consentauditors,"
"advocates," "neutral persons," and so on. Except for some types of research on
those institutionalized as mentally infirm, the National Commission recommended
that the need for such third parties be determined as a discretionaryjudgment ofthe
IRB.
In my survey of the conditions under which third parties should be intruded into
the relationship between researcher and subject, I used the generic terms which
follow [2:pp. 130-134]. "Trusted advisor" is a term applied to those who act in an
advisory capacity and who are or are not consulted, according to the wishes of
prospective subjects or persons authorized to speak for them. "Overseer" is the term
I use for agents whose employment is required by the IRB and who are empowered
to prohibit the initial orcontinuing involvement ofanyparticular subject.
When appropriate, there shouldbe a suggestion that theprospective subjectmight
wish to discuss the proposed research with another. When the proposed research
entails a consequential amount ofrisk, discomfort, or inconvenience to the prospec-
tive subject, or when there are difficult choices between reasonable alternative
therapies, consultation with a trusted advisor should be suggested, particularly if
there are factors limiting the prospective subject's autonomy orcapacity for compre-
hension.
Commonly, the trusted advisor is the prospective subject's personal physician,
when he or she has no involvement in the research. When the prospective subject has
no personal physician or when the personal physician is involved in the conduct of
the research, it maybe appropriate tooffer the servicesofanotherphysician. Inother
cases, depending upon the nature ofthe problem, the prospective subject mightwish
to consult a trusted minister, lawyer, some other appropriate professional advisor, or
even a friend who need not be a professional.
Suggesting consultation with a trusted advisor is quite a different matter from
commanding the presence of an overseer. The requirement for an overseer should
never be imposed frivolously; it is an invasion of privacy. The magnitude of the
invasion can be reduced, in some cases, by allowing the prospective subject to select
the overseer. Moreover, the imposition of such a requirement is tantamount to
declaring to the prospective subject that his or herjudgment, ability to comprehend,
ability or freedom to make choices, and the like, is to be questioned. In some cases,
however, this action willbe necessary.
THE PERSONAL PHYSICIAN AS TRUSTED ADVISOR
All too often, statements in consent forms fail to reflect adequately alternatives to
participation in the RCT, which some, perhaps most, patients might consider
preferable to any of the therapies to be administered in the RCT. Problems are
particularly likely to arise in the field of oncology, when the cancer is rapidly
progressive and resistant to therapy and the therapies to be compared are highly
toxic.
Consider this statement, from a consent form designed by a cooperative oncology
group for such an RCT:
Alternativeswhich could be considered inyour case include different drugs
or drug combinations, or radiation therapy. Another alternative is no further
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therapy, which would probably result in continued growth of the tumor. At
this time it is felt that no other therapy is more beneficial than the treatments
now proposed.
It is correct that "no further therapy" would probably-indeed, almost cer-
tainly-be associated with "continued growth ofthe tumor." Not revealed, however,
is the fact that either of the two therapies being compared most probably would,
similarly, be associated with such continued tumor growth. Moreover, each of the
two therapies is likely to cause severe nausea, vomiting, bone marrow depression,
life-threatening infections, and other serious and uncomfortable complications.
While some patients in the RCT might have satisfactory remissions, most will
experience some reduction in the number of days they have to live and in their
quality of life during those few remaining days. On balance, the average patient in
the RCTwill die soonerandwillbe lesscomfortable during his orherremaining days
than thosewhochoose "no further therapy."
Without chemotherapy, patients eligible for enrollment in this RCT will experi-
ence "continued growth of the tumor," which, in turn, will be associated with
relentless progression of disability and, eventually, death. They are informed that if
they elect to participate in the RCT, theywill receive one oftwo new therapies, each
ofwhich "have been shown tobe active." But is it fair to saythat "noothertherapy is
morebeneficial than the treatments nowproposed"?
When patients have diseases that are likely to be lethal within a relatively short
period of time, it is vitally important that the doctor and the patient have careful
discussions, designed to reach agreements about therapeutic objectives: They may
choose to (1) pursue a cure or remission, (2) maintain biologic function, or (3)
maximize comfort [19]. Such choices are essential, because pursuit of any one of
these objectives entails interventions likely to undermine the accomplishment of
either of the others [19,20]. For example, in the RCT from which the statement of
alternatives now being discussed was derived, a choice to enroll presupposes, as the
therapeutic objective, the pursuit of a cure or remission. This choice, in turn, entails
acceptance of detriments to biologic function (e.g., bone marrow depression) and
discomfort (e.g., nausea andvomiting).
The problemwith the disclosure ofalternatives aspresented in the consent form is
that it ispreemptive. Itissuitableonlyforthosewhohavechosen to pursue remission
with full awareness ofthe adverse consequences that they may expect. Only in such
cases is it appropriate to say, "[I]t isfelt that no other therapy is morebeneficial than
the treatments nowproposed." t
In situations ofthe sort I am now describing, manypatients are likely to choose as
theirtherapeuticobjective themaximization ofcomfort (orpalliative) treatment, For
this reason, the IRB at Yale-New Haven Medical Center commonly requests the
addition to consent forms oflanguage to this effect:
Before you agree to participate in this protocol, you should consult with
your personal physician. Please show your physician a copy of this protocol
and consent form and askfor his orher advice as towhetheryou should agree
to participate in this protocol.
The addition ofsuch language to the consent discussion and consent form suggest
to the prospective subject that he or she use the personal physician as a trusted
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advisor. Why not, instead, revise the consent form to include the necessity for
identification of therapeutic objectives? Because, in the judgment of the IRB,
identification of the therapeutic objective is best accomplished by a patient in
collaboration with a personal physician who-one may presume (supra)-has no
competing interest and with whom the patient has developed a satisfactory doctor-
patient relationship.
RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
I am inclined to agree with the National Commission that the dual role of
physician-researcher shouldgenerallybepermitted. Aswe have seen, there are some
conflicts, but these can usually be resolved. Shortly I shall discuss some approaches
to their resolution. First, I want to make it clear that I have not rejected out of hand
Beecher's proposal of having at least two physicians involved in the conduct of
research-one playing the role of physician-scientist and the other, one whose
primary concern is the well-being of the patient. We must take seriously Fried's
argument that one ofthe burdens imposed by participation in most, ifnot all, RCTs
is that the subject is deprived of a relationship with a physician that is characteristic
of medical practice-a physician whose only professional obligation is to the well-
being of the patient, not complicated by competing obligations to generate high-
quality data. In Fried's words, the patient-subject is deprived of the "good of
personal care" [21]. Thus, I have argued that programs like RCTs, inwhich there is a
prolonged exposure to both research and therapy-either validated (standard)
therapy or non-validated therapy (for example, investigational drugs)-one should
take seriously the proposition that there ought to be a separation of the roles of
physician and researcher [2:p. 192]. In such cases, though it might be quite appropri-
ate to rely on the physician-researcher to provide day-to-day medical care, it might
also be ofvalue to offer the patient-subject the opportunity to maintain a physician-
patient relationship with a physician who is not involved in the RCT, but who is
sufficiently familiar with the RCT to facilitate the integration ofits components and
objectives with those ofpersonal care [22].
I also agree with Beecher that informed consent is not merely not the onlyissue, it
is not necessarily even the most important issue. There mustbe reasonable assurance
that the patient-subject has ample opportunity to exercise his or her authority to
withdraw without prejudice; moreover, there must be reasonable assurance that
some competent professional, having a primary interest in the well-being of the
patient-subject, will continue to observe the situation.
Except in cases involving special problems, which are characteristic ofthe RCT, it
seems reasonable to rely on the physician-researcher toprovide adequate protection
ofthe rights andwelfare ofthe patient-subject. In the event the researcher is not the
personal physician, there should be a general presumption that no patient will be
approached with an invitation to become a subject without the approval of the
personal physician. Any exception to this general rule requires justification-for
instance, in some studies of the doctor-patient relationship, while it is essential to
gain the approval of the personal physician for approaching his or her patients in
general, it mayalsobe essential forthepersonalphysician not toknowwhichpatients
arebeing studied [2:p. 175]. As another example, the intrusion on the doctor-patient
relationship may be so minor that specific approval by the personal physician for
involvement ofeach and everysubject may serve no interest thatjustifies the expense
72CLINICAL TRIALS AND PHYSICIANS AS DOUBLE AGENTS 73
and inconvenience-e.g., most studies of medical records and pathological speci-
mens.
When confronted with a proposal to begin a project in which professionals will
playthe dual role ofphysician-researcher,judgments aboutwhether it is necessary to
introduce a third party into the relationship between the professional and the
patient-subject should be made by the IRB. In myview, there are three factors that
should be considered by the IRB in determining the necessity for special procedural
protections. To the extent that any one of these three or any combination of two or
more seems to present a problem, the IRB should consider it increasingly important
to recommend special procedural protections such as trusted advisors or overseers.
1. The extent to which the prospective subjects have impaired capacities to
consent must be considered. Are there serious limits to their autonomy, capacity to
comprehend information, or are theylegally incompetent?
2. The degree of risk presented by procedures performed in the interests of
research should be taken into account. By definition, this statement means the
degree of risk presented by maneuvers performed in the interests of developing
generalizable knowledge. It does not mean the degree ofriskpresented bytherapeu-
tic, diagnostic, or prophylactic maneuvers-their status as "investigational" or
"standard and accepted" notwithstanding. When the subjects are to be autonomous
adults, the threshold forconsideringwhether the degree ofrisk ishigh enough to call
forthe consideration ofspecial procedural protections shouldbe more than "a minor
increment above minimal risk" [2:pp. 247-248].
3. In protocols designed to introduce, test, evaluate, or compare therapeutic,
diagnostic, or prophylactic maneuvers, there may be a need for special procedural
protections to assure that: there is a clear and accurate statement ofalternatives; the
prospective subject will be afforded ample opportunity to make a valid choice
between alternatives; and the prospective subject will be fully apprised of the
consequences ofchoosing the dual role ofpatient-subject.
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